Abstract: We explain why a durable-goods monopolist would like to create a shortage during the launch phase of a new product. We argue that this incentive arises from the presence of a second-hand market and uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for the good. Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations. Some consumers are initially uninformed about their valuations and learn about them over time while others are informed through their lifetimes. Given demand uncertainty, …rst period sales may result in misallocation and lead to active trading on secondary market after the uncertainty is resolved. We characterize conditions under which the monopolist would like to restrict sales and generate a buying frenzy. We show how the monopolist may bene…t from an active second-hand market.
Introduction
Introductions of new durable goods are often featured by serious shortage coupled with active trading on second-hand markets. Examples include video games, game consoles, iPad, iPhone and luxury cars. The repeated occurrence of shortage in new product markets suggests that …rms may intentionally limit supplies to induce buying frenzies. Why does a …rm ration consumers to the secondary market when it could have served them and made more sales? If the …rm bene…ts from scarcity strategies, what is the mechanism behind it? How does the existence of second-hand market a¤ect the …rm's pro…t? These are the questions addressed in this paper.
The internet revolution has substantially enhanced active trading on second-hand markets when buying frenzies occur. 1 When iPad 2 was launched, Apple stores across the U.S. sold out of the tablet while the price of it spiked on eBay. 2 Similar phenomenon was documented for other electronics including Wii, PlayStation 2. Despite the important role played by the second-hand market, it is ignored by the existing literature aiming to explain …rms'scarcity strategies. In fact, the predominant theories are not robust against resale.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the …rst one to study durable-goods producers'incentive to induce buying frenzies while taking into account active trading on the second-hand market. Contrary to the existing literature, we argue that the existence of a second-hand market can be one of the driving forces for buying frenzies.
In our framework, consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations for the product. Some consumers are initially informed about their valuations while others learn about their valuations over time. When the seller sells to both informed and informed consumers, the product may end up with those who turn out to have low valuations. Hence, reallocation of the good among consumers takes place through the second-hand market when the uncertainty about consumers'valuations is resolved. Trading on the second-hand market will generate additional surplus. This surplus can be captured by the seller ex ante because consumers are forward-looking, and the price they are willing to pay incorporates the product's resale value. As a consequence, when selling to both informed and uninformed consumers, the monopolist faces the trade-o¤ between more sales today and a lower pro…t margin. Speci…cally, because the product's resale value is negatively related to the stock of the good in the second-hand market, selling more units today will result in a lower equilibrium price of the product. Therefore, the monopoly may …nd it optimal to create a shortage and ration consumers to the second period. Among consumers rationed to the second period, informed ones are strictly worse o¤ because they prefer to consume the good in the …rst period but cannot do so. In contrast, uniformed consumers receive the same utilities no matter if they buy the good in period one or delay consumption.
We …nd it is pro…table for the monopolist to restrict sales in the early period when 1) there is a large number of uninformed consumers, 2) few consumers have the lowest valuation, 3) the average valuation is low, or 4) the product's marginal cost is high.
Our paper is most closely related to DeGraba (1995) . DeGraba argues when consumers learn their valuations over time, a monopolist can better extract consumer surplus by committing to a …xed output short of demand. The monopolist prefers to sell the good when consumers are uninformed. This is because it can extract the entire surplus when consumers have the same expected valuations, but has to give up some surplus when consumers become informed and end up with di¤erent valuations. When output is short of demand, consumers risk losing the opportunity to buy the good if they strategically delay purchases. As a consequence, consumers all rush to buy the good when they are uninformed. DeGraba does not allow consumers to resell the product when they become informed. In fact, the existence of an active second-hand market weakens DeGraba's theory. This is because the option of purchasing the good from the second-hand market reduces the risk borne by consumers when they delay consumption. Hence, it is di¢ cult, if possible, for the monopolist to induce buying frenzies.
Several other papers including Denicolo and Garella (1999), Stock and Balachander (2005) , Allen and Faulhaber (1991) have o¤ered alternative theories for monopolist's scarcity strategies. Denicolo and Garella (1999) study a model without demand uncertainty. They argue that rationing reduces the monopolist's incentive to lower future prices and can convince consumers to buy without strategic delay. This may allow the monopolist to increase his discounted pro…t. Stock and Balachander (2005) and Allen and Faulhaber (1991) show that product scarcity can be used to signal a high quality of the product. None of these papers allows resale. In particular, in Denicolo and Garella, if consumers can resell, the arbitrage across periods will make the …rm's rationing strategy less pro…table.
In our model, the monopolist may prefer a smoothly functioning secondary market for a reason di¤erent from the existing literature (Swan (1980) , Rust (1986) , and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) ). When trade is driven by uncertainty in demand, secondary market can help the monopolist to extract surplus generated by reallocation of the good. In a similar context, Johnson (2011) studies the implications of uncertainty in demand and the presence of transaction costs on monopoly pro…t and its choice of durability.
In a related paper, Courty (2003b) studies a monopolist's selling strategy in ticket markets when there is demand uncertainty. In Courty, the monopolist sells either in early market when consumers are uninformed about their valuations for tickets or in a late market where their valuations are revealed. Despite the similar features shared with Courty, we have di¤erent …ndings. Courty found allowing resale does not improve the monopolist's pro…t. In contrast, we show the monopolist can bene…t from allowing resale when the marginal cost is high enough. The driving force for the di¤erence is because we focus on durable goods while Courty studies goods that can only be consumed once. One implication is that a monopolist is more likely to favor second-hand market when the product is more durable. This may explain why tickets sellers often take aggressive actions to kill o¤ second-hand market 3 , whereas durable goods sellers are more tolerant of second-hand market.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on intertemporal pricing. Previous work has studied how the monopolist can use advance-purchase discount (Nocke et al. 2011 , Dana 1998 or refund (Courty and Li 2000) to price discriminate between consumers when the uncertainty of consumers'valuations is resolved over time. Our paper di¤ers from the previous work by allowing consumers to resell, and in particular, we focus on how the option of consumer resale a¤ects the monopolist's optimal selling strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium and shows the conditions under which buying frenzies occur. Section 4 discusses whether it is in the monopolist's interest to kill o¤ the second-hand market. Section 5 discusses some extensions and shows how our model may explain one puzzling observation 4 in buying frenzies: the equilibrium price on the second-hand market is (sometimes) higher than the primary market. Section 6 concludes.
The model
In this section, we present a simple two-period model to illustrate the main idea. Section 5 discusses how the main results extend to a three-period model.
Players
A risk-neutral monopolist sells an indivisible durable good in two trading periods. There is a continuum of consumers who live for two periods. The mass of consumers is normalized to one. Consumers enter the market in period one, each buying, at most, one unit of the durable good in his life time. Consumers di¤er in their valuations for the product. A consumer is indexed by his valuation , with 2 [0; ]. We interpret a consumer's valuation as his taste multiplied by the product's quality which is commonly known and normalized to one. The parameter is distributed according to cumulative distribution function F ( ) and density function f ( ). We assume F ( ) is strictly increasing and continuous on the interval [0; ].
The distribution of is common knowledge. Consumers' valuations for the product are independent and identically distributed. If a consumer with valuation buys the product at price p in period t, t = 1; 2, his utility in period t is p. For expositional simplicity, we assume the monopolist and consumers do not discount. The monopolist wishes to maximize the total pro…t from the two periods. The marginal cost of the product is assumed to be constant at c, with 0 < c E( ) + 6 . When demand exceeds supply, consumers who wish to buy will obtain the good with equal probabilities. 7 
Timing
Period 1. The monopolist decides …rst period price p 1 and supply q 1 . Consumers decide whether to buy the good after observing (p 1 ; q 1 ).
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Period 2. The monopolist decides price p 2 and output q 2 . At the same time, a second-hand market is opened. Consumers observe (p 2 ; q 2 ) and the price on the second-hand market. Consumers who have owned the product decide whether to resell it, and consumers who haven't bought the product decide whether to buy the product and from whom to buy. the monopolist's incentive to ration consumers in the …rst period. 6 When c > E( ) + , uninformed consumers will never buy the product in period one. The product's highest possible resale value is . Hence, an uninformed consumer's maximum willingness to pay in period one is E( ) + . 7 We could allow for more sophisticated forms of rationing but they would not change the main results as long as rationing is not fully e¢ cient. 8 The observability of the supply in period one re ‡ects situations in which customers have some information about the availability of the good. For example, customers may know there is an import quota on a particular good, or they know that output will be limited because the seller announces a shortage of a necessary input such as computer chips. The observability of q1 allows consumers to correctly perceive their true probabilities of getting the good.
The Equilibrium
This section characterizes the equilibrium and highlights the conditions under which the monopolist induces a buying frenzy. We say a buying frenzy occurs when the monopolist intentionally undersupplies the product to create a shortage. To illustrate the trade-o¤ facing the monopolist, we …rst present a basic model when consumers are uninformed, and we show there is a continuum of equilibria with buying frenzies. In a buying frenzy, uninformed consumers are indi¤erent between receiving the product or being rationed out.
Building on the basic model, subsection 3.2 analyzes a richer and more realistic model with both informed and uninformed consumers. Unlike uninformed consumers, informed consumers lose out when rationed out in a buying frenzy because they strictly prefer to buy the product in the early period.
Basic Model
Assume consumers are all uninformed about their valuations in period one, i.e. = 0. In the second period, given q 1 , the monopolist and consumers make decisions to maximize their payo¤s, respectively. Because consumers become informed about their valuations and can trade with each other, it is never optimal for the monopolist to ration consumers. Market clear condition requires the secondary market price equal p 2 , the price charged by the monopolist. Second-hand market will allocate the product to consumers who value the product the most. Hence, marginal consumer's willingness to pay, b , satis…es
the product is sold by the monopolist and consumers who own the product at the beginning of period two and wish to sell in secondary market.
The monopolist chooses p 2 and q 2 to maximize his second-period pro…t
subject to the market-clear condition
Substituting b = p 2 , the interior solutions for p 2 and q 2 are determined by
and
Assumption 1 ensures the monopolist's second period pro…t is concave in q 2 . Equations (1) and (2) imply p 2 is decreasing in q 1 . This is because the more good the monopolist sells in period one, the more intense competition he will have to face against resellers, and, consequently, the lower the price in period two. We summarize the monopolist's output decision q 2 by the following lemma.
Lemma 1
The monopolist will not sell the good in the second period when q 1 1 F (c) and will sell q 2 units otherwise, where q 2 is determined by
The monopolist will stop producing the product in period two if q 1 is at least 1 F (c). The reallocation of q 1 units through the second-hand market will drive the marginal consumer's maximum willingness to pay to be, at most, the marginal cost. As a result, the monopolist will make a loss by producing more of the product. According to the solution of q 2 , the monopolist's second-period pro…t is summarized by the next lemma.
Lemma 2 The monopolist's second pro…t is zero when
determined by equation (1) .
When q 1 is less than 1 F (c), the second-period price is higher than the marginal cost and the monopolist will earn a positive pro…t (p 2 c)q 2 , where p 2 and q 2 are determined by equations (1) and (2) . Combining equations (1) and (2), we can write q 2 as (p 2 c)f (p 2 ). Accordingly, the monopolist's second period pro…t
We are now ready to solve for the monopolist's problem in the …rst period. Consider an uninformed consumer's purchase decision in period one. If he buys the good immediately, he enjoys ‡ow utility E( ) p 1 .
In the next period, the consumer will keep the product if his valuation turns out to be greater than the resale price p 2 ; otherwise, he will sell the product and earns p 2 . The consumer's expected payo¤ from purchasing the good in period one is therefore
Alternatively, the consumer can delay consumption until his valuation is revealed in period two. Because the consumer will buy the good only when his valuation is greater than p 2 , his expected payo¤ from waiting
As a result, the consumer will buy the product in period one if and only if
Essentially, the second-hand market provides an insurance to uninformed consumers. When the good's resale value becomes higher, a consumer will bear a smaller loss if he turns out to have a low valuation. Hence, the consumer is willing to pay more for the good up front.
It is worthwhile to emphasize that when a consumer decides whether to purchase the good in period one, he needs to correctly form the expectation of the price in the second period, based on the monopolist's announcement of q 1 . Speci…cally, consumers expect p 2 to be F 1 (1 q 1 ) when the announced q 1 is at least 1 F (c). And, they expect p 2 to be determined by
when the announced q 1 is smaller than 1 F (c). Because the monopolist's pro…t function is continuous in q 1 but has a kink at 1 F (c), we cannot di¤erentiate it at q 1 = 1 F (c): Hence, we divide the monopolist's …rst period problem into two regimes, regime A and B. Regime A is the range q 1 2 [0; 1 F (c)) and regime B is the range The monopolist's optimization problem in regime A is to choose q 1 to maximize
where p 2 is a function of q 1 and is implicitly determined by
subject to
Assumption 2 ensures the monopolist's pro…t function in regime A is concave in q 1 . In regime B, the monopolist only produces in period one. Consequently, the product's resale value is F 1 (1 q 1 ), and consumers' maximum willingness to pay in period one becomes E( ) + F 1 (1 q 1 ). The monopolist's optimization problem in regime B is to choose q 1 to maximize
Assumption 1 ensures the monopolist's pro…t function in regime B is concave in q 1 .
Next, we characterize conditions under which a buying frenzy occurs in period one.
Proposition 1 There exists a continuum of equilibria with buying frenzies if and only if
In a buying frenzy, the monopolist charges p 1 = E( ) + p 2 and the demand exceeds the supply.
When choosing the …rst-period output, the monopolist faces the trade-o¤ between more sales in period one and lower pro…t margins. By selling more of the product today, the monopolist will increase the stock in the second-hand market and hence reduce the product's resale value. As a consequence, a forward looking consumer is willing to pay less up front expecting a lower resale value. To better understand proposition 1, imagine the monopolist sells to all uninformed consumers in period one. Because no one will buy the product in the second-hand market, the market-clear condition implies the product's resale value is zero. Marginal bene…t from undercutting the …rst-period output by one unit is 1
, which is the marginal increase in the product's resale value. Marginal cost of it is E( ) c, the forgone pro…t per unit in the …rst period. When
< c holds, the marginal bene…t of undercutting the …rst-period output outweighs the marginal cost.
Because the monopolist charges consumers' maximum willingness to pay in period one, consumers are just indi¤erent between purchasing the good immediately and waiting. However, in equilibrium, demand must be at least the supply. To see this, suppose the monopolist's optimal pro…t is achieved at q 1 < 1. If the demand is less than q 1 , the monopolist can achieve a pro…t arbitrarily close to by undercutting price slightly below E( ) + p 2 and still managing to sell q 1 units. While there is a continuum of equilibria with excess demand, we want to point out there does exist an equilibrium in which the market just clears.
Proposition 1 implies the monopolist is more likely to restrict sales in period one when 1) there are very few consumers with the lowest valuation, 2) the average valuation is low, or 3) the product's marginal cost is high. To see the …rst implication, imagine the distribution of has a thin tail at 0, restricting the …rst-period sales will boost the product's resale value substantially because most consumers will turn out to have high valuations. Hence, undercutting output in period one will signi…cantly increase consumers'…rst period willingness to pay. Implication 2) and 3) are straightforward. When the product's resale value is zero, consumers'…rst-period maximum willingness to pay is E( ). A lower average valuation or a larger marginal cost will result in a lower pro…t margin in the …rst period. As a result, it is less costly for the monopolist to restrict sales in period one.
Two possible scenarios may occur when the monopolist induces a buying frenzy. The monopolist may sell to a fraction of consumers in period one and does not sell in period two. Or, he may sell in both periods.
According to lemma 1, the monopolist should keep producing in period two if and only if he sells less than 1 F (c) units in period one.
Corollary 1 When a buying frenzy occurs in period one, the monopolist sells in period two if and only if
The monopolist's second period output depends on consumers' average valuation. When the average valuation is low, the monopolist will sell to very few consumers in period one. The intuition is best understood by supposing that the average valuation is far below marginal cost. In order to make a positive pro…t in period one, the monopolist has to restrict sales aggressively. Doing so can boost consumers' …rst-period willingness to pay high enough to cover the marginal cost of production. As a result of the limited …rst-period sale, the product's resale price is maintained above the marginal cost. This makes it pro…table for the monopolist to keep producing in period two. In contrast, if the average valuation is already high enough to ensure a high pro…t margin in period one, it is too costly for the monopolist to cut sales in period one.
So, the product's resale value falls below the marginal cost which prevents the monopolist from producing in period two.
The trade-o¤ facing the monopolist is well captured by the basic model. In the next subsection, we discuss the more realistic model with both informed and uninformed consumers. We show the monopolist still has the incentive to create a shortage, and in a buying frenzy informed consumers are strictly worse o¤ when rationed to the second period.
Heterogenous Consumers
Because consumers are all informed in the second period, the monopolist faces the same problem in the second period as in the basic model. Now, we consider the monopolist's …rst period problem. Uninformed consumers' …rst period purchase decision has been analyzed in the basic model. Similar as uninformed consumers, an informed consumer with valuation gets ‡ow utility p 1 from consuming the product in period one. In the next period, he keeps the product if the resale price is at most and resells the product otherwise. Hence, the consumer's payo¤ from purchasing the product in period one is
, where I(:) is the indicator function. If the consumer postpones the purchase to period two, he will buy the product if and only if his valuation is larger than p 2 . Consequently, consumer should purchase the product in period one if and only if
, and hence his maximum willingness to pay in period one is + p 2 .
If the monopolist charges p 1 in period one, demand from informed consumers is
Demand from uninformed consumers is 1 if p 1 E( ) + p 2 ; and zero, otherwise. Accordingly, the monopolist's …rst period problem is to solve the following program
where (p 2 ) is characterized in lemma 2.
The monopolist should choose between selling to informed consumers only by charging a price higher than uninformed consumers' maximum willingness to pay, and selling to both informed and uninformed consumers at a lower price. Speci…cally, if p 1 > E( ) + p 2 , only informed consumers whose valuations are at least p 1 p 2 will buy the product. When p 1 is at most E( ) + p 2 , the cohort of uninformed consumers will buy the product along with informed consumers with valuations greater than p 1 .
Lemma 3
Buying frenzies will not occur if the monopolist charges a …rst period price other than uninformed consumers' maximum willingness to pay E( ) + p 2 .
To see lemma 3, suppose the monopolist sells to a fraction of informed consumers who wish to buy the good at p 1 > E( ) + p 2 . The monopolist can make more pro…t by selling the same units at a higher price p 0 1 where the demand at p 0 1 equals supply. Lemma 2 shows the monopolist's second period pro…t only depends on his …rst period sales q 1 . Hence, this alternative selling strategy won't a¤ect the monopolist's second period pro…t but will yield more pro…t in the …rst period. Following the same logic, the monopolist will not ration consumers at p 1 < E( ) + p 2 . Lemma 3 implies the monopolist may have an incentive to ration consumers only when he charges a price equal uninformed consumers'maximum willingness to pay.
, there exists 2 0; min F (c)
; 1 , such that the monopolist induces a buying frenzy for < . In the buying frenzy, informed consumers strictly prefer to buy in the …rst period while uninformed consumers are just indi¤ erent between buying in period one and waiting. When 0 < c < E( )
, 8 2 [0; 1], the monopolist sells to all consumers who wish to buy.
When the monopolist targets the cohort of uninformed consumers, he faces the similar trade-o¤ in the basic model. However, di¤erent from the basic model, the product has a positive resale price even if the monopolist sells to every one who wishes to buy at the …rst period price. This is because the good may be allocated to uninformed consumers who turn out to have extremely low valuations. These consumers will …nd it pro…table to sell the product to informed consumers who have higher valuations but do not get to buy the good in period one.
Lemma 3 has shown buying frenzies will not occur had the monopolist targeted informed consumers only.
Hence, the scarcity strategy is more appealing when there are su¢ ciently many uninformed consumers. With a general distribution, it is di¢ cult to solve the model explicitly. Nevertheless, we can provide an example with discrete valuations to show this point. Suppose the marginal cost is c 2 (0; ):So the monopolist may only sell to high-type consumers in the second period. In this environment, the monopolist can choose among three alternatives selling schemes in period one according to di¤erent ranges of the parameters.
EP. The monopolist charges uninformed consumers'maximum willingness to pay and sell to all consumers who wish to buy. In this case the optimal price is equal to h; which is the expected value in period 1 (a consumer can purchase the product for free in the second-hand market if he decides to wait). In equilibrium,
there is no active second-hand market and no new units are sold in the second period. The monopolist pro…t is ( h c)(1 + h):
HP. The monopolist excludes uninformed consumers and only sell to informed consumers with high valuations. Speci…cally, he will sell h units in period one at price 2 and (1 )h units in period two at price to the consumers who become informed about their valuations for the good. The monopolist pro…t will be (2 c) h + ( c)(1 )h:
RP. Finally, the monopolist may charge uninformed consumers'maximum willingness to pay and ration consumers at this price. In period one, the monopolist will always sell a quantity equal to the fraction of high type consumers, i.e. q 1 = h. To see this, note that the monopolist will not sell a quantity between h and h + (1 )(1 h) because the product's resale price drop to zero if the monopolist sells more than h. 9 Selling less than h is not optimal. Suppose q 1 < h, the monopolist will …nd it optimal to sell h q 1 units to the high type in the second period at price h. But then the monopolist can do better by selling h units in the …rst period. Doing so will not a¤ect the resale price and will allow the monopolist to extract more surplus in the …rst period because consumers are willing to pay more when they consume the good in both periods. At price 
Banning Secondary Market
If goods are perfect substitutes, the monopolist might prefer to avoid the competition with used units by closing the second-hand market. Our framework looks at a di¤erent prospective by introducing uncertainty about consumers'valuations of the product. We show how a monopolist might bene…t from an active secondhand market because it improves the allocation of the good among consumers with di¤erent valuations once the uncertainty is resolved. During the launch of the good, the uncertainty about consumers' valuations is likely to generate a misallocation of the good. The possibility of trading the good on the second-hand market generates a larger consumer surplus that will be captured by the monopolist at the time the product is launched. 11 For clarity of exposition and to focus on the main aspect of this section, we restrict our analysis to the basic case with = 0:
Without the second-hand market, the monopolist faces a standard static problem in the second period because all consumers are informed about their valuations. Given that q 1 units of the product have been sold, he chooses p 2 to maximize 2 = (p 2 c)(1 F (p 2 ))(1 q 1 ). The optimal p 2 is determined by
. In period one, since the product does not have a resale value, a consumer's expected payo¤ from buying it immediately is E( ) p 1 + E( ); his expected payo¤ from waiting until period two is
. Hence, the consumer will buy the product in period one if and only if
. The monopolist's …rst-period problem is to choose q 1 and
Without the second-hand market, consumers' …rst-period willingness to pay does not depend on the …rst-period sales. Consequently, (q 1 ; p 2 ) is a weighted average of the pro…t margins in two periods, with the weights q 1 and 1 q 1 respectively. The monopolist will sell to all consumers in period one if and only if the pro…t margin in period one is greater than period two. Speci…cally, the monopolist's solution is
where p 2 is determined by equation (8) .
, the monopolist is just indi¤erent between selling in period one or two. In other words, selling in both periods will not yield the monopolist a pro…t higher than selling in a single period. In sharp contrast, when the monopolist allows consumers to trade on the second-hand market, he may strictly prefers to sell in both periods (see corollary 1).
Proposition 3 When maxf ; 2E( )g c < E( )+ , the monopolist prefers to have the second-hand market.
Clearly, when c, the monopolist will make a zero pro…t in the second period regardless of whether there is a second-hand market. Hence, the monopolist prefers the second-hand market only when it can make more pro…t in period one by allowing resale. Consider the scenario without a second-hand market.
The surplus per unit from selling in period one is 2E( ) c: If c is larger than 2E( ), the surplus is negative and hence the monopolist will make a loss by selling in period one. However, it may be pro…table for the monopolist to sell in this case when there is a second-hand market. This is because trading on the secondhand market improves allocation e¢ ciency, and hence generates a larger surplus in period one. For example, if the monopolist sells to only one consumer in period one, the product will be traded to the consumer with the highest valuation in period two. Hence, the social surplus generated in period one is E( ) + c.
Discussion
Learning from experience In the main model, an uninformed consumer's valuation is revealed to him in the second period no matter whether he has purchased the product in the …rst period. An alternative learning rule is that a consumer learns his valuation only through consumption in the …rst period. In this case, if an uninformed consumer does not purchase the good in the …rst period, his maximum willingness to pay in the second period is still the expected valuation. Hence, learning from experience puts a constraint on the product's resale value. However, as long as the product's resale value is positive, the trade-o¤ between more sales in the …rst period and a lower pro…t margin in the …rst period still exists. We can still …nd the parameter values that make it more pro…table for the monopolist to sell below the quantity demanded.
Multiple-period model
The main idea can be easily extended to an overlapping generation model in which a cohort of old informed consumers are mixed with a cohort of new uninformed consumers in each period. The existence of both informed and uninformed consumers may induce the monopolist to charge a price di¤erent from the price in the second-hand market.
Intuitively, when the size of uninformed new consumers is relatively larger than the informed old consumers, it is more pro…table for the monopolist to target the uninformed cohort (the argument is similar to the previous discussion about heterogeneous consumers). By targeting the new uninformed consumers, the price on the primary market will be, at most, the sum of the expected valuation and the product's future resale value. For the same reason presented in the main model, the monopolist may want to ration consumers in order to maintain a high resale value of the product. Given the proportional rationing assumption, informed and uninformed consumers are equally likely to be rationed to the second-hand market. The willingness to pay of the marginal informed consumer who has been rationed by the monopolist and is just indi¤erent between whether or not to buy the good on the second-hand market will be determined by the price on second-hand market. Everything else equal, the lower is the quantity traded on the second-hand market, the higher is the equilibrium price on the second-hand market. If consumers do not buy and resell the product in the same period, the product's resale price could be higher than its primary price when there are very few units available on the second-hand market. This prediction …ts the observation that during a buying frenzy, a product's resale value is sometimes higher than its primary price. We modify the example of discrete valuations with two periods to show this point.
Example 2. Discrete valuations and 3 periods. In the 3-period model, we assume that in the second period there is a new cohort of mass-one heterogenous consumers entering the market who has the same composition as the cohort in the period one. As in example 1 in a 3-period model, there are three equivalent possible optimal monopoly strategies. Under EP the monopoly will sell only in the …rst two periods and charge p 1 = 2h + and p 2 = h + ; and sell to all consumers who wish to buy, i.e. the uninformed consumers and the high types informed consumers. Under HP, the monopolist sells only to the informed high types at p 1 = 3 ; p 2 = 2 and p 3 = : Finally under RP, the monopolist will sell only in the …rst two periods at p 1 = h +2 and p 2 = h + : The prices are determined as in example 1 except for taking into account of an extra period in determining p 1 : The monopolist will sell overall 2h units and speci…cally q 1 = (1 ) + h and q 2 = 2h q 1 with proportional rationing in period 2 only: We focus the attention to the case where = 0:6; h = 0:7; c = 0:3 and = 0:6: As discussed above under a RP strategy, a 3-period model generates an equilibrium price on the second-hand market which is higher than the primary-market equilibrium price. In fact in the second period, the demand for new units at the price 1.02 is equal to the informed high type consumers entering in the second period, i.e. 0.42, plus all the uninformed consumers,
i.e. 0.4. Because the amount sold by the monopolist in the second period is 0.58, the proportional rationing will lead to 0.123 informed consumers, who are willing to pay up to 1.2 to get the good, rationed and 0.117 uninformed consumers, who are willing to pay up to 1.02, rationed. In the secondary market, there will be 0.12 units available from the low type who own the good. These consumers can extract all the surplus from the high type by charging a price equal to 1.2 on the secondary market. Table 2 6 Conclusion This paper explains why a durable-goods monopolist would like to restrict supply and induce a buying frenzy in the presence of an active second-hand market and demand uncertainty. While the existing literature ignores the important role played by the second-hand market, we argue that the option of reselling the product on the second-hand market can be one of the driving forces for this …rm's strategy. As is pointed out by the existing literature that the existence of second-hand market forces the monopolist to compete with resellers, we show the monopolist may still prefer to have a second-hand market. This is because trading on a secondhand market can improve allocation e¢ ciency in the presence of demand uncertainty and hence increase the monopolist's pro…t.
Finally, we emphasize that our explanation does not exclude other explanations for product scarcity. In particular, the scarcity of fashion products can also be driven by consumers'need for exclusivity. Moreover, similar behavior could be explained in a context where …rms can in ‡uence social learning among consumers by manipulating the launch sequence of a new product. It is noted that it can be pro…table for a …rm to restrict the access of a new product to consumers in order to induce a purchasing herd (Liu and Schiraldi 2011) .
This implies the marginal revenue of q 2 , 8 q 2 > 0, is always smaller than the marginal cost when q 1 1 F (c).
So, q 2 = 0; 8 q 1 1 F (c).
Next, we show q 2 is determined by
for q 2 < 1 q 1 . When q 1 < 1 F (c), marginal revenue of q 2 evaluated at q 2 = 0 is larger than c. Hence q 2 is either the interior solution determined by (9) or the corner solution q 2 = 1 q 1 . Next, we rule out the corner solution. Equation (1) implies that p 2 > c when q 1 < 1 F (c). To see this, suppose p 2 c. The left hand side of equation (1) is nonpositive. When q 1 < 1 F (c) the right hand side of equation (1) is larger than
Proof for proposition 1: Let q 1 denote the monopolist's optimal output in period one. We …rst show
< c is a su¢ cient condition for q 1 < 1. By lemmas 1 and 2, when q 1 1 F (c) (regime B), the monopolist earns zero pro…t in period two. The derivative of B (q 1 ) with respect to q 1 is
:
B (q 1 )j q1=1 < 0, and the monopolist can improve his pro…t by undercutting the output below q 1 = 1.
< c is a necessary condition for q 1 < 1. First, we show the monopolist's total pro…t function is concave in q 1 , for
. The second derivative of the pro…t function in regime B is
Then we show the monopolist's pro…t function is concave in q 1 , for q 1 2 [0; 1 F (c)) (regime A). Take the derivative of A (q 1 ) with respect to q 1 and substitute
, we have
The second derivative is therefore
Assumption 1 and assumption 2 imply @p 2 @q 1 < 0 and 1 + q 1 (3f
Hence,
00
A (q 1 ) < 0.
Finally, we show the monopolist's total pro…t function is continuous and globally concave in q 1 . Because
, which equals to the pro…t in regime B at q 1 = 1 F (c). Since the monopolist's pro…t is concave in regimes A and B, it is globally concave if
. Lemma 1 has shown p 2 = c when q 1 = 1 F (c).
Similarly,
Clearly,
Because the pro…t function is globally concave in
< c is a necessary condition for q 1 < 1. Q.E.D.
Proof for corollary 1: According to lemma 1, the monopolist will sell in period two if and only if its optimal …rst period output q 1 < 1 F (c). Proof of proposition 1 has shown the the monopolist's total pro…t function is globally concave in q 1 . Consequently, q 1 < 1 F (c) if and only if the derivative of the total pro…t function in regime A is negative when evaluated at q 1 = 1 F (c). Refer to the proof of proposition 1,
, the monopolist chooses q 1 < 1 F (c) and sells in both periods. Otherwise, he only sells in period one. Q.E.D.
Proof for lemma 3: Let (p 1 ; q 1 ) denote the monopolist's solution for program (6) . Suppose p 1 > E( )+p 2 .
Given p 1 , the monopolist's …rst period demand is (1 
The monopolist can sell q 1 units at a higher price p 0 1 = p 1 + "; " > 0 and " ! 0. To see this, when " is su¢ ciently close to 0, p
Similar as the argument in the case of p 1 > E( )+p 2 , (q 1 ; p 0 1 ) is more pro…table than (p 1 ; q 1 ). A contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Proof for proposition 2:
Step 1 shows for each c > E( ) 1 f (0)
, the monopolist induces a buying frenzy for small enough. Let e q 1 denote the optimal units the monopolist wishes to sell in period 1 at
, and e Q 1 denotes the …rst period demand facing the monopolist at this price. Demand
, where 1 is the demand from uninformed consumers and
is the demand from informed consumers. For each c > E( ) 1 f (0)
, 1 F (c) < q 1 , provided that < min F (c) F (E( )) ; 1 . By lemmas 1 and 2, the monopolist produces nothing and earns zero pro…t in period 2 if he sells more than 1 F (c) in period 1. The monopolist's problem in regime B is to choose q 1 to maximize objective function (5) F (E( )))) : F (E( ))) ) :
The derivative
By assumption 1,
f 2 (F 1 ( F (E( )))) > 2 F (E( )) > 0: ; 1 such that 0 B ( e Q 1 ) < 0 for < .
Step 2 shows when 0 < c E( ) 1 f (0)
, the monopolist does not ration consumers 8 2 [0; 1]. For a given c, we …rst show the monopolist does not ration consumes for 8 2 [0; F (c) F (E( )) ).
Step 1 has shown when < F (c) F (E( ))
, 1 F (c) < q 1 . Evaluate ).
Next, we show the monopolist does not ration consumes for 8 2 F (c) F (E( )) ; 1 . When F (c) F (E( )) , Proof for proposition 3: First consider the scenario without second-hand market. When c, the second period price p 2 is larger than . No one will buy in the second period. The …rst period price is at most E( ) + [F (p 2 )E( j p 2 ) + (1 F (p 2 )) p 2 ] = 2E( ). So, if maxf ; 2E( )g c, the monopolist will not sell in period one either and he will make zero pro…t. Now, consider the scenario with secondary market. The monopolist can make a positive pro…t by selling to at least one consumer in period one if maxf ; 2E( )g < c < E( ) + . To see this, note that when c maxf ; 2E( )g, 1 F (c) 0. Hence, regime
A does not exist and we focus on regime B: The proof for proposition 1 has shown that the the derivative of pro…t function in regime B is 0 B (q 1 ) = E( ) + F 1 (1 q 1 ) c q 1 f (F 1 (1 q 1 ) ) :
Evaluate 0 B (q 1 ) at at q 1 = 0, we have E( ) + c. When c < E( ) + , @ @q 1 j q1=0 > 0. Therefore the optimal …rst period output q 1 > 0. Q.E.D.
